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Abstract 
In order to access justice, victims of human rights abuses must first find a jurisdiction that 
is willing to hear their case. In the Abdoulay Yerodia Ndombasi (Yerodia) case in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), victims of Yerodia’s intentional crimes brought 
their case in Belgium because they were unable to introduce it in domestic courts. Belgium 
launched an international arrest warrant against Yerodia who, at the time of accusation by 
Belgium, was Foreign Minister of the DRC. This has led to a dispute between the DRC 
and Belgium before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The DRC accused Belgium of 
violating the diplomatic immunity of its Foreign Minister. However, the international 
crimes in question were committed before Yerodia became Foreign Minister of the DRC 
and the ICJ rendered its decision in his case after he had ceased to hold that position. 
Despite this, the ICJ ruled in favor of Yerodia's diplomatic immunity and consequently 
this decision has only protected him from criminal liability. This paper examines first the 
historical background of the discrimination of Yerodia’s victims to support the claim that 
they cannot access justice in the DRC. It also argues that the ICJ’s decision in this case has 
only contributed to shielding Yerodia from justice rather than preserving smooth operation 
of the DRC’s diplomatic activities abroad. Finally, this paper suggests that the ICJ’s 
decision in this case has closed the doors to victims in their endeavors to access justice.  
 
1. Introduction 
It has been more than two decades since the DRC witnessed conflicts in which a plethora 
of gross violations of human rights occurred in the context of targeted inter-ethnic violence. 
Most crimes committed during this violence remain unpunished, a situation that may 
contribute to their reoccurrence in the future. These tragic events include the massacres of 
the Tutsi in August 1998. The immediate trigger of these killings were certain speeches 
advocating racial hatred, which were made during the outbreak of the second civil war in 
August 1998 by some high ranking authorities in the DRC including, among others, the 
late President Laurent Désiré Kabila and his former Private Secretary and Chief of Cabinet 
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Yerodia.1 That war was fought in opposition to the Kabila regime by the rebels of the Rally 
for Congolese Democracy (RDC) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). 
Officially, the rebels claimed to oppose the expansion of a new dictatorship in the DRC.2  
To respond to the insurgency, the Kabila regime mobilised members of other 
Congolese communities to exterminate the Tutsi in the DRC. The Tutsi were accused of 
conniving with foreign forces to destabilise the country and were referred to as ‘scum and 
vermin that must be methodically eradicated and with determination.’3 Although at time 
of writing no research has yet been conducted to identify the exact number of victims, these 
hateful speeches spread a destructive ideology against the Tutsi in the DRC which resulted 
in the massacres of thousands. According to Vollhardt, one of the characteristics of these 
speeches is dehumanisation of the victims.4 For example, during the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, the Tutsi were compared to ‘cockroaches.’ Similarly, in the DRC in August 1998, 
the Tutsi were compared to ‘vermin and scum.’  
Due to extensive involvement of the DRC’s high-ranking officials in the heinous 
killing campaigns, victims were unable to bring their cases in domestic courts in the DRC. 
However, some family members of victims, who resided in Belgium, filed their actions in 
a Belgian court.5 On11 April 2000, Judge Damian Vandermeesch of the Brussels Tribunal 
of First Instance issued an international arrest warrant against Yerodia, in which he 
described the crimes committed as crimes against humanity and war crimes.6 The Yerodia 
arrest warrant was issued in a case which also investigated Kabila, his former Minister of 
information Didier, Mumengi, former communications manager in the presidential office, 
Dominque Sakombi, and his former Interior Minister, Gaeta Kakudji.7 In Belgium, this 
case was filed under the Belgian Law of June 16th 1993 as amended by the law of 10 
February 1999. This law concerns the punishment of the grave breaches of international 
humanitarian law and provides Belgian courts with jurisdiction over international crimes 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, irrespective of the nationalities 
and residences of the victims and accused and the places where the alleged crimes took 
place.8  
Instead of cooperating with the Belgian justice system in order to hold a perpetrator 
of international crimes accountable for his wrongdoing, the DRC’s authorities chose to 
shield Yerodia from justice. In this regard, they instituted proceedings against Belgium at 
the ICJ to seek cancelation of that arrest warrant. In its application, the DRC claimed a 
 
1 Alberto Luis Zuppi, ‘Immunity v. Universal Jurisdiction: The Yerodia Ndombasi Decision of the 
International Court of Justice’ (2003) 63 Lousiana Law Review 309, 311–312. 
2  Erna Sif Bjarnadóttir, ‘Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo: A Study Of “New Wars”’ (Master 
thesis, University of Iceland 2017) 31. 
3  Safari Chizungu, ‘Yerodia Guerre Aux Tutsi RDC 1998’ (10 October 2013) 
<youtube.com/watch?v=gyajJhWgcQY> accessed 1 December 2019. 
4  Johanna Ray Vollhardt, ‘Destructing Hate Speech in DRC: A Psychological Media Sensitization 
Campaign’ (2007) 5 Journal of Hate Studies 15, 26–27. 
5  Zuppi (n 1) 311. 
6  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (Judgment) 
(2002) ICJ Rep 3. 
7  Cours d’Appel de Bruxelles, ‘Arret 16 Avril 2002 (Yerodia)’ 
<competenceuniverselle.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/arret-16-avril-2002.pdf> accessed 1 December 
2019. 
8  Jan Wouters and Leen de Smet, ‘The ICJ's Judgment in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000: Some Critical Observations’ (2001) 4 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 373. 
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violation of the functional immunity of its incumbent Foreign Minister by Belgium.9 The 
ICJ rendered its final judgment in this case a year and a half after Yerodia ceased to hold 
that position and ordered Belgium to cancel its arrest warrant. In its decision, the ICJ 
upheld the DRC’s complaint.10 
However, although the DRC’s authorities used the outbreak of war in August 1998 
to justify the massacres of the Tutsi nationwide, it is widely known that the Tutsi have been 
the subject of many forms of injustice on the basis of their ethnicity in the DRC for many 
years. Therefore, the first section of this paper examines the historical background of the 
discrimination and marginalisation of the Tutsi in the DRC, matters considered to be the 
direct precursor to the massacres of August 1998. Although the ICJ did not directly address 
the crimes of which Yerodia was accused in Belgium, its decision has contributed to 
shielding him from justice. The same decision obstructed the access to justice of the victims 
in the DRC as well as in other foreign judicial forums. Hence, the second section of this 
paper examines whose justice in this case (victims or perpetrator of international crimes) 
as well as the implication of the ICJ decision on victims’ right to access justice.  
 
2. Historical Background of the Discrimination Against the Tutsi in the 
DRC: The Precursors to the Massacre in August 1998  
From the colonial period until the present, the Tutsi have undergone numerous injustices 
in the DRC because of their ethnicity. Since it has been proven in numerous cases that 
ethnic politics culminate in suspicions among communities and generate violence,11 this 
situation has resulted in the violation of many of their rights, including their right to life. 
Before the independence of 1960, the colonial administration had put in place some 
policies that excluded the Tutsi from the governance of the DRC. For a better 
understanding of why the DRC’s authorities called for the extermination of the Tutsi in 
August 1998, one needs to revisit the history of their discrimination and marginalisation 
in the DRC, as briefly discussed below.  
 
2.1 Exclusion of the Tutsi from Governance During Colonial Administration  
2.1.1 The Historical Settling of the Tutsi in the DRC 
Although there is some controversy regarding the settling of the Tutsi in the DRC, many 
available historical sources confirm that they arrived in three main groups from the region 
which is today known as the countries of Rwanda and Burundi. The first group, known as 
‘Banyamulenge’, was already present in the South Kivu province in Eastern DRC before 
the demarcation of the borders of African countries during the Berlin Conference that took 
place between 1884–1885.12 Some of the Banyamulenge were looking for pastures for their 
livestock; others fled the conflicts that occurred during the reign of Ruganzu II Ndoli of 
1510–1543 and others fled the famine that occurred under the reign of Yuhi IV Gahindiro 
around 1746–1802, both from the former kingdom of Rwanda.13 The second group of Tutsi 
came to the DRC during Belgian colonial rule in the 1930s, under the migration waves 
known as ‘the Transplantation of Rwandan and Burundian populations in the Kivu 
 
9  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (Application 
Instituting Proceedings) (2002) ICJ Rep 3 [174]. 
10  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (n 6). 
11  Emily Paddon and Guillaume Lacaille, Forced Migration Policy Briefing: Stabilising the Congo (Refugee 
Studies Centre, University of Oxford 2011) 6. 
12  SL Rukundwa, ‘The Banyamulenge of the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Cultural Community in the 
Making’ (2009) 60 Theological Studies 369, 369–371. 
13  ibid. 
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provinces and recruitment of manpower to work in plantations and mines.’14 Most of the 
members of this second group settled in the current North Kivu province. The third group 
came to the DRC fleeing persecution in Rwanda and Burundi, following ethnic conflicts 
which took place at various intervals between 1959–1961 and 1963–1973 after these 
countries became independent.15 However, members of this third group who came from 
Burundi returned to Burundi shortly after independence, and those who came from 
Rwanda returned to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi. In other words, the Tutsi 
discussed in this article, who were victims of the massacres of August 1998 in the DRC, 
are the Banyamulenge and those who emigrated to the DRC in the 1930s.  
The term ‘Tutsi’ is used in this article to include all members of the Tutsi 
community of the DRC, while the term ‘Banyamulenge’ refers specifically to the Tutsi who 
live in the high plateaus of the Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga zones in the South Kivu province, 
who settled in that region before the demarcation of the borders of the African countries. 
 
2.1.2 Colonial Administrative Policy Excluding the Tutsi from Governance  
The exclusion of the Tutsi from governance in the DRC began during the Belgian colonial 
administration. This colonial power regulated the administrative institutions for the first 
time in the DRC with the decree of 6 October 1891. That decree simply recognised different 
local entities which already existed, but it simultaneously suppressed those which belonged 
to the Banyamulenge in the South Kivu province.16 Some experts on the region, such as 
Koen, argue that the creation of these native authorities by the Belgian colonial 
administration was only a strategy to control the local populations and to integrate their 
local authorities.17 Turner also confirmed the idea of controlling ethnic groups, but he 
added that during that period, the Banyamulenge were reputed to be uncooperative with 
the colonial administrative power and therefore were excluded from local administration.18 
The geographer, Weis, also wrote towards the end of the colonial period that, during 
colonial rule, the Banyamulenge faced severe discrimination because they resisted paying 
taxes and participating in the population census, as well as because they threatened to rule 
over other Congolese communities and to reduce the influence of Europeans over the 
DRC.19 Other experts of the region attribute the suppression of the Banyamulenge 
chieftaincies in the South Kivu province by the colonial rule to the fact that they opposed 
its policy of land exploitation introduced in the 1930s. That policy focused on agriculture. 
The Banyamulenge opposed it as they were concerned for the survival of their livestock 
and, consequently, their local administrative entities were suppressed and annexed to those 
of other communities.20 In the North Kivu province, the situation was the same because 
the Tutsi and other Kinyarwanda-speaking communities, notably Hutu populations, were 
also denied access to customary powers because of their origin.21  
 
14  FM Ndahinda, ‘Collective Victimization and Subjectivity in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Why do 
Lasting Peace and Justice Remain Elusive?’ (2016) 23 International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights 137, 156. 
15  ibid. 
16  Rukundwa (n 12) 381–382. 
17  Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the 
Banyamulenge’ (2002) 29 Review of African Political Economy 499, 502.  
18  Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth & Reality (Zed Books Ltd 2007) 81–82. 
19  ibid. 
20  Rukundwa (n 12) 381–382. 
21  Jason Stearns and others, Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu (Rift Valley 
Institute 2013) 17. 
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The denial of customary power to the Banyamulenge and other Tutsi, as well as 
other Kinyarwanda speaking communities during the colonial rule, has led to their 
exclusion from governance in the DRC and this issue has always been a subject of tension 
and conflict between the Tutsi and other communities in the DRC. This is because, in the 
DRC, indigenous authorities are regarded as highly important by the local population. 
Powers at the local level are defined mono-ethnically even though the inhabitants of a local 
entity come from different ethnic groups.22 For example, there is a collectivity of Bafuliru 
(one of the communities of the Uvira district in South Kivu), but the inhabitants of that 
entity are from different ethnic groups and this is the case in most local entities in the DRC. 
This exclusion has had a negative effect on the exercise of democratic rights by the Tutsi 
in the DRC because at time of writing many of their compatriots still consider them as 
foreigners in their own country, a sentiment which nourished their killings in August 1998. 
 
2.1.3 Ethnic Violence Against the Banyamulenge During the 1964 Post-colonial 
Conflicts 
The DRC gained independence on 30 June 1960, but six months later, on 17 January 1961, 
its first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated.23 Although Lumumba was 
not killed in a civil war, his death was the beginning of various types of conflict in the 
DRC.24 His former education minister, Pierre Mulele, launched an uprising against the 
Kinshasa regime, which he considered to have colluded with foreign powers to assassinate 
Lumumba. That insurrection reached the areas of Fizi, Uvira, and Mwenga in the South 
Kivu province where the Banyamulenge lived under the command of rebel leader Simba.25 
Among Simba’s commanders in that area was the late President Kabila, who had his 
headquarters in the Hewa Bora mountains in the Fizi District. Although members of other 
communities in South Kivu joined that rebellion en masse, the Banyamulenge were 
reluctant. Consequently, that conflict quickly turned into an inter-ethnic military campaign 
against the Banyamulenge, where they were brutally killed and their properties looted.26 In 
other words, in the native region of the Banyamulenge in South Kivu, the post-
independence conflict was turned into an inter-ethnic conflict between the Banyamulenge 
and the rebels led by the late President Kabila. In response, the Banyamulenge created a 
militia group called ‘abagiriye’ which means ‘the warriors’ in English or ‘les guerriers’ in 
French. These warriors played a major role in chasing President Kabila out from the 
mountains of Hewa Bora to Tanzania in 1967.27 President Kabila returned to the DRC 
political scene in 1996, where he was accompanied mostly by the same Banyamulenge and 
other Tutsi whom he fought against during the post-independence conflict of the 1960s.  
It is remarkable that the call for the extermination of the Tutsi by the late President 
Kabila’s regime in August 1998 had an element of this bitter historical past. In their 
messages, the DRC’s authorities justified these killings ‘as a means to resolve the problems 
 
22  Mahmood Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu: Report of the CODSRIA Mission to the Democratic of 
Congo (Center for African Studies 1997) 12. 
23  Marianne Thamm, ‘From Our Archives: The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the Ghosts of History 
and the Policing of Remembrance’ (Daily Maverick, 2016) <dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-01-22-the-
assassination-of-patrice-lumumba-the-ghosts-of-history-and-the-policing-of-remembrance/> accessed 1 
December 2019. 
24  Jonathan Cole, ‘The Congo Question: Conflicting Visions of Independence’ (2006) 43 Emporia State 
Research Studies 26, 27. 
25  Stearns and others (n 21) 16. 
26  ibid. 
27  Jason Stearns and others, Mai Mia Yakutumba: Resistance and Racketeering in Fizi, South Kivu (Rift Valley 
Institute 2013) 16. 
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of the Tutsi in the DRC once and for all.’ As a significant number of the soldiers and 
politicians from the Tutsi community in the east of the DRC had rallied the rebellion, the 
late President Kabila’s regime likely had the goal of revenge, because the Tutsi 
(Banyamulenge) had contributed to the blocking of his political ambitions since the 1960s, 
after independence. This can be deduced from many of his speeches that followed the 
outbreak of war in 1998. In his various public speeches, the late President Kabila indicated 
that the liberation war in the Congo begun during the 1960s insurrections against neo-
colonialism rather than with the Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo 
(AFDL) in October 1996.28 In other words, the killing of the Tutsis of August 1998 in the 
DRC was not a spontaneous reaction by the DRC’s authorities to the outbreak of the war 
in the two Kivu provinces. Rather, it had a correlation with the past relationship of the 
Tutsi with those in power, especially the late President Kabila and Yerodia, who were 
among the rebellion leaders during the post-colonial conflicts. 
 
2.1.4 Controversy over the Congolese Nationality of the Tutsi  
The question of the ethnicity of the Tutsi in the DRC was also manipulated by politicians 
during the Mobutu regime. In the 1970s, when Mobutu realised that he had totally defeated 
the post-independence insurrections in all parts of the country, he began to consolidate his 
power by exploiting ethnicity. A debate on the Congolese nationality of the Tutsi and other 
Kinyarwanda-speaking peoples in the DRC was discussed at the national level from the 
1970s.29 This debate brought the Zaire/DRC parliament to adopt a law in 1972 that 
granted nationality to all persons who arrived in the DRC before 1959. This law replaced 
that of 1964, which considered as Congolese only those persons who were in Congolese 
territory before October 1908.30 However, the law of 1972 was heavily criticised by many 
politicians in Zaire/the DRC, as a result of the growing influence of the Tutsi in the 
Mobutu regime.31 In 1981, the law of 1972 was amended and the cut-off date was moved 
back to that in the law of 1964 because it limited Zairian/DRC citizenship to the 
descendants of tribes which were established in the Congo/DRC before August 1885.32 
Technically, that law did not affect the Banyamulenge because they were already 
established in the Kivu region before that period. However, this legislation was applied to 
all the Tutsi without exception. Consequently, they were denied the right to vote and to 
stand as candidates in the parliamentary elections that took place between 1982 and 1987 
due to ‘dubious nationality.’33 Moreover, in April 1987, the Zaire/DRC government 
ordered a census of the Banyamulenge in the Vyura locality (in the districts of Moba and 
Kalemie of the current Tanganika province) in order to exile them to Rwanda. However, 
the Banyamulenge boycotted that census and consequently all their local chiefs and 
opinion leaders were arrested and imprisoned for a period of one year and six months in 
the central prison of Lubumbashi.34 Furthermore, during the democratisation process of 
the 1990s in Zaire/the DRC, the Tutsi were excluded from participating in the National 
 
28  Francois Ngolet, Crisis in the Congo: The Rise and the Fall of Laurent Desire Kabila (Palgrave MacMillan 
Publishers 2011) 15. 
29  Jason Stearns and others (n 21) 18. 
30  Henning Tamm and Claire Lauterbach, Dynamic of Conflict and forced Migration in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (Refugees Studies Center, University of Oxford, 2010) 3. 
31  Mamdani (n 22) 7. 
32  Henning Tamm and Claire Lauterbach (n 30). 
33  FM Ndahinda, ‘Bemba Banyamulenge Case Before the ICC: From Individual to Collective Criminal 
Responsibility’ (2013) 7 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 476, 480. 
34  Interview with some of the persons who were detained in Lubumbashi. 
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Sovereign Conference (NSC) that took place between 1991 and 1992, again due to dubious 
nationality. That conference was supposed to draft a new constitution and set new 
foundations for multiparty democracy.35 The controversies over the Congolese citizenship 
of the Tutsi have greatly contributed to their discrimination in and exclusion from many 
aspects of life, including politics in the DRC. 
Today, the issue of the citizenship of the Tutsi in the DRC seems to be legally settled 
because, during the Lusaka Peace Agreement which put to an end to the second war in the 
DRC, the parties agreed that ‘all ethnic communities whose territories came to be the 
Congo at independence should qualify to have equal rights and protection in law as 
Congolese citizens.’36 The same principle was also confirmed by the DRC’s Constitution 
of 2006.37 However, although the question of the Congolese identity of the Tutsi cannot be 
legally questioned, in practice they are still victims of xenophobic practices and ethnic 
violence in the DRC. Examples are the attacks that are directed against them in the South 
and in the North Kivu provinces. The members of this community are also obliged to be 
squeezed into their provinces of origin, notably the South and North Kivu provinces, 
because their security cannot be fully guaranteed in other parts of the country and they are 
still hardly accepted by their fellow Congolese in other regions. The non-acceptance of the 
Tutsi as true Congolese in the DRC has also nourished the campaigns of the killings of 
August 1998. 
 
2.2 Other Major Events Marking Xenophobia Against the Tutsi in the DRC 
2.2.1 Resolution on the Expulsion of the Tutsi from the DRC of April 1995 
In April 1995, the Zairian/DRC Transitional Parliament passed a Resolution to expel all 
the Tutsi from the DRC, starting with the Banyamulenge in South Kivu.38 Implementing 
this Resolution in October 1995, the administrator of the Uvira zone in South Kivu, 
Shweka Mutabazi, ordered the Banyamulenge to leave the high plateaus of Mulenge and 
go to Rwanda by qualifying them as ‘an unknown ethnic group of Zaire/the DRC.’39 That 
order was followed by many killings of Banyamulenge in the city of Uvira, Baraka, 
Bubembe and in the Plain of Ruzizi. Moreover, in September 1996, the former vice-
governor of the South Kivu province, Lwabanji Lwassi Ngabo, also ordered the 
Banyamulenge to vacate South Kivu within six days, otherwise he would order them to be 
burnt.40 Meanwhile, in the North Kivu province, multiple attacks against the Tutsi were 
being carried out by the Zairian/DRC security forces, in collaboration with Hutu militias 
from Rwanda recruited in the refugee camps.41 Facing discrimination and ethnic violence 
in their own country, the majority of youths from the Tutsi community fled to 
neighbouring countries in the east, notably to Rwanda and Burundi where they returned 
in October 1996 with the AFDL. It is this movement that overthrew the dictatorship of 
 
35  Ndahinda (n 14) 157. 
36  Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations, ‘Final Act (Sun City Agreement)’ (United Nations Peacemaker, 
2 April 2003) 
<peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_030402_SunCityAgreement.pdf> accessed 1 
December 2019, 24. 
37  The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2005) 
<constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/DRC%20-%20Congo%20Constitution.pdf> accessed 1 
December 2019, art 10. 
38  Stearns and others (n 21) 19. 
39  Manassé Ruhimbika, Les Banyamulenge (Congo-Ex Zaïre) Entre Deux Guerres (préface de B. Jewsiewicki) 
(L’Harmattan 2001) 299. 
40  ibid. 
41  Ndahinda (n 14) 159. 
 Elusive Justice for Victims of the Abdoulay Yerodia International Crimes of August 
1998 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 171 
 
Mobutu in May 1997 and installed the late Kabila as President of the DRC. It is 
incontestable that authorities in the DRC tried and failed to expel the Tutsi from the DRC 
several times. Following the speeches of several DRC authority figures, including Yerodia 
and the late President Kabila, during the outbreak of the war in August 1998, the killing of 
the Tutsi was a way to remove them once and for all from the DRC’s territory. 
 
2.2.2 Influx of Hutu Refugees from Rwanda and Burundi to the DRC in 1993–1994 
The massive arrival of the Hutu refugees from Burundi and Rwanda between 1993 and 
1994 also increased the xenophobia against the Tutsi in the DRC. Those who came from 
Burundi had fled the inter-ethnic conflict that took place between 1993 and 1994 and those 
who came from Rwanda crossed into Zaire/the DRC after the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi.42 
During that period, relations between the Kinshasa leadership and the regimes in Kigali 
and Bujumbura were not good. Therefore, the late President Mobutu seized the 
opportunity to work closely with these refugees by providing them with military training, 
so that they could help him deal with any threat that might come from Eastern Zaire/the 
DRC. Combatants from the refugee camps also took advantage of the situation to 
destabilise their countries of origin.43 Among these refugees were some who had 
participated in ethnic violence in their home countries, including those who participated 
in the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda. Hence, they have greatly contributed to 
spreading hate against the Tutsi in Zaire/the DRC. Testimonies from the survivors of the 
massacres of August 1998 have implicated some of the Hutu refugees in these heinous 
crimes. Illustratively, they are alleged to have participated in the killings which took place 
in the two Kivu provinces as well as in Vyura, Kalemie, Kamina and Lubumbashi in the 
former Katanga province.44 This also explains that the international crimes in which 
Yerodia was involved in August 1998 in the DRC were nourished by a cross-border 
ideology against the Tutsi that prevailed in the countries of the Great Lakes Region.  
 
2.3 Immediate Causes of the 1998 War and the Massacres of the Tutsi in the 
DRC 
When the conflict broke out in August 1998, the DRC government quickly qualified it as 
a Tutsi-led rebellion supported by Rwanda and Uganda and therefore called for 
extermination of the Tutsi in the DRC. However, the international crimes committed 
during this period were at the origin of the dispute between the DRC and Belgium at the 
ICJ.45 The examination of the immediate triggers of these massacres is essential in order to 
understand the context in which the crimes in question were committed. 
 
2.3.1 The Struggle for Power 
Some partially concurred with the DRC authorities that the 1998 war was initiated by 
Uganda and Rwanda in order to protect their security and economic interests in the 
region.46 However, there is also disagreement. According to Francois Ngolet, shortly after 
 
42  The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 'Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Causes, Impact and implications for the Great Lakes Region’ (Economic Commission for Africa, 2015) 
14. 
43  International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict’ (African 
Report no 56, Nairobi/Brussels, 2003) 5.  
44  Testimonies from the survivors. 
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the takeover of powers in Kinshasa, President Kabila started to rule over the DRC along 
with the majority of people from his own tribe, namely the Lubakat from Katanga.47 He 
began to appoint them to different key strategic positions in the government, army and 
police as well as in the intelligence service.48 In particular, most of the people − mainly 
Tutsi − who had fought alongside him against Mobutu were excluded from the circle of 
power.49 For example, his former Army Chief of Staff, General Masasu Nindaga, who was 
half Tutsi and half Mushi, was arbitrarily accused of conniving with foreign intelligence 
services and was later murdered. After his killing, the report of the International Crisis 
Group later revealed that General Masasu Nindaga was killed because he had discovered 
that the secret service of the late President Kabila weas recruiting and providing arms to 
the Hutu refugees from Rwanda and Burundi in Eastern DRC.50 
 It is true that many politicians and soldiers from the Tutsi community had joined 
the rebellion of August 1998. However, those whom I contacted during the writing of this 
paper attribute this to their discrimination and marginalisation by the regime of the late 
President Kabila.51 Moreover, the fact that some Tutsi politicians and soldiers joined the 
rebellion should not have been a reason to call for the extermination of the entire Tutsi 
community in the DRC.  
It is also important to mention that among the rebels who were fighting against the 
Kabila regime during that period were regrouped people from different backgrounds in the 
DRC: for example, the political leaders of the Congolese Rally for Democracy movement 
(RDC), notably Professor Arthur Zaid Ngoma (a Murega from the Maniema province), 
Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba (a Mukongo from the Bas-Congo province) and Jean 
Pierre Ondekane, the military commander of the movement (a Ngbaka from the Equateur 
province in North-East Congo).  
Considering the nature of the conflict and those who were involved, it is clear that 
belligerents were fighting for power at a high level, which led to an armed conflict. In fact, 
the late President Kabila and members of his inner circle wanted to control power, while 
the rebels, who were mostly composed of those who fought alongside him against Mobutu, 
were against that style of governance. Considering their history of discrimination and 
marginalisation in the DRC, the Tutsi became collateral victims because some of the 
politicians and soldiers from their community were among those who had opposed the 
Kabila regime. In that context, yet again, these massacres constituted a sign that, according 
to the then leadership of the DRC, the Tutsi did not deserve the same right to oppose the 
government as other Congolese had, a fact which amounts to discrimination. 
 
2.3.2 Insecurity in the Two Kivu Provinces  
After the 1997 regime change in the DRC, the populations of the two Kivu provinces 
hoped to regain security. In particular, the Tutsi were expecting to see their rights 
guaranteed, like those of other Congolese in the DRC. However, after the takeover of 
power in Kinshasa, they realised that the regime change itself was not enough to guarantee 
their security and rights. This realisation was due to the fact that in the South Kivu 
province, the Mai Mai (local militias) started to attack the Banyamulenge and raid their 
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cattle. In the North Kivu province, these local militias were working in collaboration with 
the Hutu militias from Rwanda to attack the Tutsi villages and to raid their properties.52 
Despite this, in February 1998, the military leadership in Kinshasa surprisingly ordered the 
removal of all soldiers from the Tutsi community in the two Kivu provinces. 
Unfortunately, that order was not implemented because the soldiers concerned mutinied 
and forced their leadership to revise that decision.53  
During that period, it was clear that the army high command suspected the Tutsi 
who were in the national army of not respecting its orders, while the Tutsi soldiers 
suspected the soldiers from other ethnic groups of collaborating with the Mai Mai and 
Hutu militias from Rwanda and Burundi to attack their villages in the two Kivu provinces. 
In addition to the local insurrections, rebel groups from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi 
were operating in the east of the country, where they were involved in many human rights 
abuses. That situation increased suspicions among communities in these two provinces 
and led to the outbreak of the war in eastern provinces in August 1998. 
 
2.3.3 Conspiracy Theory on the Creation of a ‘Tutsi-Hamites Empire’ in Central Africa 
The term ‘conspiracy theory’ is defined in this article as an explanatory belief regarding 
certain actors meeting in secret to agree and carry out a hidden agenda that is widely 
regarded as malicious.54  
It is clear that many of the wars that occurred in the countries of the Great Lakes 
region of Africa (Eastern DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi) had an inter-ethnic character and, 
therefore, a conspiracy theory developed around the possible creation of a ‘Tutsi-Hima’ 
empire in the Central African region. The proponents of that theory argued that the various 
wars which occurred in this region were nourished by a hidden regional agenda of the 
Nilotics to establish an empire in the region, under which the Bantu populations would be 
dominated.55 To them, the war against Mobutu of 1996 was not a liberation war but an 
ideological one for the Nilotics in which the late President Kabila was used to achieve their 
regional agenda.56 As this conspiracy theory was already established in the DRC when 
Kabila came to power in 1997, his administration experienced many difficulties in dealing 
with the Tutsi who worked in different institutions and in the security forces. This was 
because some members of the population of the DRC did not consider the Tutsi as people 
who were serving their nation; rather, they were seen as having a hidden agenda. The Hutu 
extremists used the same theory in Rwanda during their sensitization campaigns to 
exterminate the Tutsi in 1994. The artisans of the theory considered the war that began in 
Rwanda in 1990 against the Habyarimana regime (that of the former Rwandan president) 
as a means of creating a ‘Tutsi zone’ comprising Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Kivu 
regions of Zaire/the DRC.57 In the DRC, this conspiracy theory was mostly spread by 
politicians from the two Kivu provinces and was later fueled by the arrival of the Hutu 
refugees from Rwanda and Burundi following the inter-ethnic conflicts of the 1990s in 
these countries. 
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When Yerodia was asked why he called for the extermination of the Tutsi during 
the outbreak of the second war in the DRC, his response was that he believed that the war 
had the purpose of exterminating the Bantu populations in the Central African region.58 
The former president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, gave almost the same answer when 
he was asked why he supported the Kinshasa regime during that war. He mentioned that 
his army went to prevent the expansion of the Tutsi-Hamites Empire in the center of 
Africa.59 This conspiracy theory has been used to fuel inter-ethnic violence in the countries 
of the Great Lakes Region and has already resulted in many Tutsi victims, including those 
of August 1998 in the DRC. At present, this conspiracy theory still threatens the security 
of the Tutsi in the DRC and thus constitutes one of the obstacles to victims of the massacres 
of August 1998 in accessing justice in the domestic courts of the DRC. 
 
3. The Yerodia Case at the ICJ: Whose Justice (Victims or Perpetrators of 
International Crimes)  
In its judgment of February 2002, the ICJ confirmed that the arrest warrant issued by 
Belgium against Yerodia violated customary international law concerning the absolute 
inviolability and immunity from criminal proceedings for incumbent Foreign Ministers.60 
However, the international crimes of which Yerodia was accused were committed before 
he became Foreign Minister and the ICJ rendered its decision when he had ceased to hold 
such position. The thorny question remains as to whose justice this judgment serves. 
 
3.1 The Chronology of Events in the Yerodia Case at the ICJ  
The international crimes of which Yerodia was accused were committed in August 1998, 
when he was a Private Secretary and Chief of Cabinet of President Kabila. Belgium issued 
an arrest warrant against him on 11 April 2000, when he was Foreign Minister.61 His case 
was brought before the ICJ on 17 October 2000, with the DRC accusing Belgium of having 
violated the diplomatic immunity of its Foreign Minister in office.62 However, one month 
later, in November 2000, Yerodia was demoted from the position of Foreign Minister and 
appointed as Minister of Education, a post that he occupied until April 2001.63 On 14 
February 2002, the ICJ rendered its judgment, in which it confirmed the DRC’s complaint 
and requested Belgium to cancel the arrest warrant because it violated the diplomatic 
immunity of an incumbent Foreign Minister, without considering the time when the 
relevant crimes took place and the changes that had occurred in Yerodia’s position during 
the proceedings.  
 
3.2 Immunity of Senior State Officials Under International Law  
As a general rule, immunity is a privilege that is attached to certain positions or status of 
particular persons, entities, or properties and which is normally used to exclude the 
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exercise of jurisdiction over them.64 Several arguments have been advanced as to the 
reasons for the granting of immunity, though most of them are based on legal fiction. The 
first is the ‘extraterritoriality theory’, which assumes that heads of State and diplomats, 
when they are abroad on missions, are still considered as being in their own countries 
rather than in the host State.65 The second is the personification or representative theory, 
which considers heads of State or diplomats as holders of the collective powers of their 
States within their host States when they are on missions abroad.66 The third argument is 
that of ‘functional necessity’. Under this theory, heads of State and diplomats need special 
protection during the tenure of their office or whilst abroad in the performance of their 
duties.67 Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 
also provides that ‘the purpose of diplomatic privileges and immunities is to ensure the 
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.’68 
According to Article 21, Paragraph 2 of the New York Convention on Special Missions of 
December 1969: 
 
The Heads of the Governments, the Foreign Ministers and other persons of high rank, when they 
take part in a special mission of the sending State, shall enjoy in the receiving State or in a third 
State, in addition to what is granted by the present Convention, the facilities, privileges and 
immunities accorded by international law.69  
 
This explains that the logic behind the functional immunity is to protect the persons 
mentioned above against any act of a foreign authority that would prevent him or her from 
conducting diplomatic activities freely. In other words, functional immunity serves to 
protect the activities that someone is carrying out and this is precisely what the DRC 
complained of when it instituted proceedings against Belgium before the ICJ.  
 
3.3 Who Benefited from the ICJ’s Judgment in the Yerodia Case? 
At the time of the ICJ’s judgment, Yerodia had not occupied the post of Foreign Minister 
of the DRC for a year and a half. Despite this, the ICJ based its conclusions on the 
functional need to protect his diplomatic activities abroad. The Court emphasised that ‘the 
functions of a Foreign Minister are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, 
he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability.’ 
On one hand, the ICJ confirmed that the purpose of such immunity is to enable 
foreign ministers to freely conduct international relations on behalf of their countries. On 
the other hand, the Court’s decision created a dilemma because it was rendered after 
Yerodia had ceased to carry out such activities on behalf of the DRC. In fact, Yerodia had 
ceased to occupy any ministerial position in the DRC; at that moment he was a Senator. 
Clearly, the diplomatic immunity of which the ICJ ruled in favour in this case had no real 
meaning because there was a disconnect between the motivation behind the judgment and 
the facts. Consequently, the immunity in question only served to protect a perpetrator of 
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international crimes from criminal responsibility, to the detriment of victims' right to access 
justice.  
 
4. The Preventive Nature of Diplomatic Immunities v the ICJ’s Decision 
in the Yerodia Case 
In its decision, the ICJ confirmed that the arrest warrant which had been issued by Belgium 
against Yerodia violated the immunity that incumbent foreign ministers enjoy under 
international law in foreign domestic courts. This is a well-known rule in public 
international law.70 However, considering the changes in Yerodia’s position, specifically 
the fact that Yerodia was no longer the Foreign Minister of the DRC at the time of the 
judgment, Belgium objected to that decision. 
 
4.1 Belgium Objects After Changes to Yerodia’s Position during the Proceedings 
before the ICJ  
After Yerodia’s removal from the position of Foreign Minister during the proceedings, 
Belgium objected to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in his case. Belgium argued that, from the 
moment Yerodia had ceased to occupy the post of Foreign Minister, the dispute between 
it and the DRC before the ICJ had ceased to exist. Belgium also reminded the ICJ that if 
the Court wished to proceed with the case until the final decision, its nature had changed 
and it had become a diplomatic protection case in which Yerodia had not exhausted 
domestic remedies.71  
However, all objections put forward by Belgium were rejected and the ICJ ruled 
that its jurisdiction would be determined at the time a case is filed with it. Moreover, the 
ICJ ruled that the changes which had occurred in relation to Yerodia’s position during the 
proceedings did not put an end to the dispute between the parties and had no effect on its 
object.72 Therefore, the ICJ concluded that the question of the lawfulness of the arrest 
warrant issued against Yerodia remained a pending issue as far as the case had not changed 
into one of diplomatic protection.73 Considering these changes, the decision of the ICJ in 
this case was not pragmatic, but rather a mechanical application of immunity. 
 
4.2 The Non-Pragmatic Character of the ICJ’s Decision in the Yerodia Case 
It is a mammoth task to challenge the judgment of an international court such as the ICJ, 
but the reason it made progress in the Yerodia case which obstructed its continuation in 
Belgium was not pragmatic. Some scholars even criticised it as contradicting the current 
trend and willingness of the international community to prosecute international crimes.74 
Others argued that it lacked the balance between the interests and values underlying this 
dispute, which were on one hand the fight against the most heinous crimes and on the 
other hand the maintenance of smooth collaboration between States.75 In reality, the 
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decision completely disregarded the preventive nature of the DRC’s application before the 
ICJ.  
From the outset, the DRC persistently complained about violation of the immunity 
belonging to its acting Foreign Minister, as the arrest warrant would prevent him from 
conducting diplomatic relations freely abroad. The ICJ’s decision in this case was also 
based on the functional immunity of an incumbent Foreign Minister, a position which 
requires substantial foreign travel, which would be deterred by the existence of an 
international arrest warrant.  
In fact, when the ICJ rendered its judgment in this decision, Yerodia was not vested 
with the power to conduct such activities. Further, the ICJ did not provide any objective 
explanation in its judgment as to why its jurisdiction must be determined at the time a case 
is filed rather than when its decision is rendered or when the alleged violations (in the 
present case international crimes) took place. Hence, the objections that were advanced by 
Belgium to contest the jurisdiction of the ICJ after the change in the position of Yerodia 
were pragmatic, as during that period he was a former foreign minister who had no 
responsibility to conduct international relations on behalf of the DRC. In other words, in 
that decision, there is a contradiction between the ICJ's argumentation and the status of 
Yerodia at the time of the judgment.  
In short, the arguments of the ICJ to reject Belgium’s objections were not grounded 
in international law. The Court’s decision makes it clear that, instead of adjudicating a 
practical case that was presented before it for ruling, the judges merely developed theories 
around the immunity of incumbent foreign ministers in general.  
 
4.3 Mechanical Application of Immunity by the ICJ in the Yerodia Case 
The ICJ is an interstate court created under the United Nations Charter of 1945, with a 
mandate to adjudicate interstate disputes submitted to it.76 This Court can also receive 
disputes between States on behalf of their nationals who have suffered harm at the hands 
of another State and such a dispute remains between the States.77 However, despite the fact 
that the Yerodia case was instituted by the DRC against Belgium, the judgment in this case 
only contributed to shielding Yerodia from criminal responsibility rather than preserving 
the smooth operation of the DRC's diplomatic activities abroad. In other words, the 
application of immunity in this case by the ICJ was purely mechanical. As a result, this 
decision was used to serve an interest that it was not intended to protect. Furthermore, it 
is unfortunate that from February 2002, when the ICJ rendered its decision in the Yerodia 
case, no case in relation to the international crimes in which he was involved has been 
initiated elsewhere. This proves that the judgment contributed to closing the doors to 
victims in their endeavor to access justice, either in the DRC or in other foreign forums. 
Hence, the beneficiary of this situation is the suspect of international crimes, to the 
detriment of victims’ right to access justice.  
 
5. Access to Justice for Victims of Yerodia’s International Crimes 
In order to access justice, victims must first find a judicial body that is willing to hear their 
case. Domestic jurisdictions always have the competence to address international crimes 
and under specific conditions, foreign jurisdictions also have this competence. When 
government authorities are alleged to be involved in the perpetration of such crimes, 
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victims often face many difficulties in accessing justice in domestic courts and therefore 
lose confidence in their national justice system. It is precisely in this context that victims 
of Yerodia’s international crimes brought their case in Belgium. Unfortunately, through 
the ICJ’s judgment, the DRC’s government obstructed the continuation of the case in 
Belgium. The remaining question is the impact of the decision on the victims of Yerodia’s 
international crimes, regarding their access to justice in domestic and foreign courts.  
 
5.1 The Impact of the ICJ’s Decision on Access to Justice for Victims of 
Yerodia’s Intentional Crimes in the DRC 
Until the Second World War, international law considered the treatment of citizens by 
their States as an internal issue. However, after the horrific crimes which occurred during 
that War, States began to be aware of the limits of their sovereignty over the human rights 
of the persons under their control.78 Consequently, many human rights instruments 
currently recognise the principle of aut dedere aut judicare: extradite or prosecute.79 This 
principle obliges States either to prosecute suspects of international crimes or to extradite 
them to where they can be properly prosecuted. The idea behind this principle is to ensure 
that no suspect of international crimes can go unpunished.  
The DRC is a State party to many international human rights instruments 
guaranteeing the respect for human rights and which contain the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide as well as the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment.80 At the 
regional level, the DRC is also a State party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights as well as its Protocol on the Establishment of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights.81 Moreover, the DRC’s Constitution provides many rights, including the 
right to life and physical integrity, the right to non-discrimination, the right not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and the right to access justice.82 
Shortly after Yerodia’s accusation in Belgium, he was appointed Minister of 
Education and later became a Senator, a position that had provided him with immunity 
from criminal prosecution before national courts. Therefore, the ICJ’s decision in the 
Yerodia case has somehow confirmed the sovereignty of the DRC in dealing with his 
international crimes, thus leaving victims without any further recourse to national courts.  
However, the non-prosecution of suspects of international crimes in the DRC, such 
as Yerodia, is a failure of the DRC’s government to fulfill its international obligations and 
its own Constitution. This situation reinforces the reign of impunity in that country and 
encourages the reoccurrence of the same crimes. In addition, the efforts deployed by the 
DRC’s government in the Yerodia case at the ICJ have also revealed to victims and their 
supporters its determination to prevent any trial regarding the international crimes of 
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which Yerodia was accused. In other words, the ICJ’s decision in this case has silenced 
victims in their quest for remedies in national jurisdictions. 
 
5.2 The Impact of the ICJ’s Decision on Access to Justice for Victims of 
Yerodia’s Intentional Crimes in Foreign Domestic Courts 
Although the ICJ’s decision in the Yerodia case was in support of his immunity, at the same 
time it emphasised that this immunity is not synonymous with impunity. The ICJ 
identified four situations in which a Foreign Minister can generally be prosecuted by 
foreign jurisdictions. The first situation is where international law does not provide 
immunity for Foreign Ministers before national jurisdictions. The second situation is when 
such immunity has been revoked by one’s own country. The third is when a Foreign 
Minister ceases to hold such a position. The fourth is that, before certain international 
criminal courts such as the ICC, when they have jurisdiction, a Foreign Minister cannot 
invoke his/her immunity.83  
It is unfortunate that, at the time of the ICJ’s judgment, it was already clear that 
Yerodia would not be affected by any of these situations. This is because, in the first and 
the second situations, the State concerned must be willing to prosecute or to revoke the 
immunity of its Foreign Minister.84 In Yerodia’s case, although he was not covered by 
immunity under international law in domestic courts, the ICJ’s judgment was handed 
down when he was covered by another immunity provided for under national law. At that 
particular moment he was a member of the Senate in the DRC and, as senators enjoy 
immunity in domestic courts, the possibility of prosecuting him in national courts or the 
willingness to revoke his immunity was already non-existent. Concerning the third 
situation, the ICJ was incorrect to rule in favour of Yerodia’s immunity because, in fact, 
this immunity became inoperative when he was removed from his position as Foreign 
Minister. As is usual, after his removal from that position, the DRC appointed another 
Foreign Minister who oversaw its international relations and who enjoyed the same 
immunity that Yerodia enjoyed after the ICJ’s decision in his case. In other words, by 
ordering Belgium to cancel the arrest warrant and claiming that Yerodia was still covered 
by immunity under international law while he was no longer Foreign Minister, the ICJ 
simply claimed the opposite regarding the third situation. Concerning the fourth situation, 
at the time of the ICJ’s judgment there was not a special international tribunal for the DRC. 
The DRC ratified the Statute of the International Criminal Court in April 2002,85 two 
months after the ICJ’s decision in the Yerodia case. This Statute entered into force for the 
DRC on 1 July 2002 which means that it had no jurisdiction over the crimes of which 
Yerodia was accused, under the principle of non-retroactivity of its jurisdiction.86  
As argued by Darryl Robinson, immunity is an exception to the general rule that 
gives States jurisdiction over all persons under their control. Any confirmation of such 
immunity must be dictated by an interest to serve important societal and international 
interests.87 However, this was not the scenario in the Yerodia case at the ICJ, as its ruling 
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in favour of Yerodia’s immunity only shielded him from prosecution by foreign courts and 
has jeopardised the victims’ right to access to justice in foreign courts. Although the change 
in Yerodia’s position of November 2000 was already a strategy by the DRC to protect him 
from being prosecuted abroad, the ICJ’s decision reinforced that measure as it expressly 
ruled in favour of his immunity. It is also evident that after a decision by an institution like 
the ICJ, other countries will be reluctant to accept complaints from victims against Yerodia 
and other suspects in relation to similar international crimes.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Since its independence in 1960, the DRC has experienced several epochs of conflict in 
which thousands of people have lost their lives through inter-ethnic violence. Some were 
caused by members of different communities fighting amongst themselves and many others 
were the result of political manipulations orchestrated by certain politicians in order to 
achieve their political ambitions. Moreover, most of the crimes committed as a result of 
this violence remain unpunished, a situation which has, many times, led to their 
reoccurrence. The massacre of the Tutsi of August 1998 is one of these tragic events which 
was orchestrated by politicians, and in which victims were targeted because of their 
ethnicity, and its perpetrators remain unpunished. These massacres were triggered by 
Yerodia’s and the late President Kabila’s speeches advocating racial hatred during the 
outbreak of the war in August 1998 in the DRC. These high-ranking officials accused the 
Tutsi, as a community, of conniving with foreign countries, notably Uganda, Rwanda, and 
Burundi, to destabilise the DRC, and called members of other Congolese communities to 
exterminate them. In their messages, broadcast in international media, they described the 
Tutsi as ‘Scum and vermin that must be methodically eliminated and with determination.’ 
These speeches were followed by concrete acts in which thousands of Tutsis lost their lives. 
However, although DRC officials used the outbreak of the war in August 1998 to 
justify these horrific crimes, it is evident that, for many years, the Tutsi have been victims 
of discrimination and other forms of injustices in the DRC because of their ethnicity. Since 
the colonial era, Tutsi in the DRC were denied the right to customary power and therefore 
excluded from governance. From the post-independence conflict until today, Tutsi in the 
DRC have also been frequently targeted because of their origin during the successive wars 
that occurred in the DRC. Moreover, their Congolese identity was repeatedly manipulated 
by different politicians for their political purposes. These facts and others were among the 
direct precursors to their massacres of August 1998.  
As to the security context that prevailed in the DRC during that period, there were 
already three intertwined wars going on. First, there was a local conflict which resulted 
from intercommunity resentments inherited from the colonial period in the two Kivu 
provinces. The second was a national conflict resulting from general governance issues in 
the DRC. The third was a regional conflict resulting from the insecurity that was prevailing 
in all the countries of the Great Lakes region, due to the presence of a high number of 
refugees and uncontrolled combatants across the region. In particular, the conspiracy 
theory around the possible creation of the ‘Tutsi-Hamites’ empire in the Central African 
countries, which was propagated in the countries of that region, constituted an additional 
threat to the security of Tutsi in the DRC during this period. 
The international crimes committed in August 1998 during the massacres of the 
Tutsi were at the origin of a dispute between the DRC and Belgium at the ICJ. The dispute 
arose from an international arrest warrant that an investigating judge of a First Instance 
Tribunal of Brussels had issued against Yerodia, who at the time of the issuance of this 
arrest warrant was Foreign Minister, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
However, the crimes in question were committed before Yerodia had become Foreign 
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Minister and the ICJ rendered its decision a year and a half after he left office. Despite this, 
the ICJ ruled in favour of his immunity from prosecution in foreign courts. As the reason 
for granting such immunity is to avoid any act of foreign authority that could hinder 
diplomats in the performance their duties abroad, the ICJ’s decision in the Yerodia case 
completely disregarded the preventive nature of such immunity. Since it was issued when 
Yerodia was no longer a Foreign Minister, it contradicted the rationale behind such 
immunity under international law. In the same decision, the ICJ provided no objective 
justification under international law as to why its jurisdiction must be determined at the 
moment when a case is filed before it rather than at the moment it renders its decision.  
Although the ICJ’s judgment in this case did not directly address the issue of the 
international crimes of which Yerodia was accused, it contributed to shielding the suspect 
from being brought to justice, both in domestic and foreign courts. Moreover, the efforts 
deployed by the DRC to obstruct the continuation of this case in Belgium have also 
revealed to victims and their supporters its determination to prevent the commencement 
of any proceedings against the perpetrators of the above-mentioned crimes anywhere. 
Further, after the ICJ’s decision in this case, no other case was brought elsewhere regarding 
Yerodia’s international crimes. After a decision of such a highly regarded international 
institution, it is clear that countries will be reluctant to receive complaints from victims in 
relation to the same case.  
Finally, the ICJ’s decision in the Yerodia case has also left victims in the hands of 
those who have deployed enormous efforts to shield the perpetrators of their crimes from 
justice, a fact that has reduced them to silence in their quest for justice. 
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